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Optimizely Flaw Turned Trusted Web Scripts Into Skimmers
An attacker abused a flaw in Optimizely's Web Experimentation service on Monday, November 16, to slip malicious JavaScript into the testing scripts that 178 organizations load on their public websites, according to researchers at Report URI. The code tried to steal payment card details and cryptocurrency, captured screenshots and readable cookies, and steered iPhone and iPad users toward known iOS exploit kits. Report URI listed CNN, the BBC, Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab, HSBC, Equifax and IKEA among the sites involved. Optimizely acknowledged the incident in a status notice early on November 17, saying the vulnerability was patched, the rogue code was gone from customer projects and affected user accounts had been secured.
Optimizely's product works by having each customer place a small script, which the company calls a snippet, on its pages. That file carries the customer's experiments plus an optional block of custom code known as Project JavaScript, which runs on every page view. Scott Helme of Report URI wrote that the attacker added a short loader to that block and left everything else alone. Because the altered files still came from Optimizely's own content delivery network with a valid certificate, the websites had no reason to treat them as suspicious. Helme stressed that the delivery network itself had not been poisoned and only served what it received. Optimizely's own main site and login page carried the code as well.
How the attacker gained write access to so many unrelated accounts was unclear at first. Optimizely later told BleepingComputer that the weakness sat in the Experimentation account signup flow. The company said it blocked the vulnerable path, ended active sessions, revoked tokens, reset access for affected users and notified every affected customer. Report URI saw signs that access persisted during the day: a snippet belonging to Smartsheet was cleaned and then infected again with a version that hid the attacker's address in base64 text.
Report URI found the code in 188 of the 1,611 Optimizely snippets it was able to check, and it expects the true count to be higher. Banking and finance made up the largest group, with 32 organizations, and six insurers were also on the list, including Mutual of Omaha and Admiral. According to the firm's timeline, the first injection showed up in the BBC's snippet at 04:21 UTC and the operators rebuilt their main payload 26 times as the day went on. Most snippets were cleaned around 20:40 to 21:10 UTC, and Report URI said every infected file had been clean since late that evening.
The payload had several jobs. It searched pages for valid wallet addresses across a long list of blockchains and swapped them for the attacker's, including in text a visitor copied. A card skimming module, added that afternoon, waited for a number, expiry date and security code to be submitted through a site's own form fields. Researchers said it could not see cards typed into hosted payment frames from providers such as Stripe or Adyen. When it swapped an address near payment wording, the script also sent back the page URL, any cookies not marked HttpOnly and a rendered screenshot.
On Apple mobile devices the code fetched a separate script that read the iOS version and loaded either the Coruna or the DarkSword exploit kit in a hidden frame. Hudson Rock, in findings cited by SecurityWeek, said the evidence linked the campaign to exploit delivery infrastructure but did not prove any device was actually compromised, and Cynet described what it captured as conditional delivery rather than a confirmed takeover. Report URI tracked roughly $7,040 in crypto reaching the attacker's wallets on Monday, while StepSecurity put the figure near $6,600 and noted that some of those wallets were active earlier. Nobody has been able to say how many card numbers were taken. The same actor had pushed a related loader through Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media scripts in the days before, according to Report URI. SecurityWeek noted that Optimizely had reported a separate voice phishing intrusion in February.
The incident underscores that a script approved once can change without notice and still arrive from a trusted host. Banks, insurers and other enterprises should keep an inventory of every script running on payment and login pages, with a business justification for each, and should be able to detect unauthorized changes to those scripts and to security headers. PCI DSS 4.0 requirements 6.4.3 and 11.6.1 already expect exactly this for payment pages, and auditors can test whether those controls would have caught a modified vendor file within hours. Subresource Integrity does not fit snippets that update themselves, so a strict Content Security Policy that limits where scripts can send data, hosted payment fields, and keeping marketing and testing tags off checkout pages matter more. Vendor oversight should cover who can edit tag platform accounts, how tokens are rotated, and how quickly a provider will report tampering. Teams that used Optimizely should review project change history for November 16, rotate exposed session cookies and treat cards entered on their own forms that day as possibly compromised.
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Optimizely's product works by having each customer place a small script, which the company calls a snippet, on its pages. That file carries the customer's experiments plus an optional block of custom code known as Project JavaScript, which runs on every page view. Scott Helme of Report URI wrote that the attacker added a short loader to that block and left everything else alone. Because the altered files still came from Optimizely's own content delivery network with a valid certificate, the websites had no reason to treat them as suspicious. Helme stressed that the delivery network itself had not been poisoned and only served what it received. Optimizely's own main site and login page carried the code as well.
How the attacker gained write access to so many unrelated accounts was unclear at first. Optimizely later told BleepingComputer that the weakness sat in the Experimentation account signup flow. The company said it blocked the vulnerable path, ended active sessions, revoked tokens, reset access for affected users and notified every affected customer. Report URI saw signs that access persisted during the day: a snippet belonging to Smartsheet was cleaned and then infected again with a version that hid the attacker's address in base64 text.
Report URI found the code in 188 of the 1,611 Optimizely snippets it was able to check, and it expects the true count to be higher. Banking and finance made up the largest group, with 32 organizations, and six insurers were also on the list, including Mutual of Omaha and Admiral. According to the firm's timeline, the first injection showed up in the BBC's snippet at 04:21 UTC and the operators rebuilt their main payload 26 times as the day went on. Most snippets were cleaned around 20:40 to 21:10 UTC, and Report URI said every infected file had been clean since late that evening.
The payload had several jobs. It searched pages for valid wallet addresses across a long list of blockchains and swapped them for the attacker's, including in text a visitor copied. A card skimming module, added that afternoon, waited for a number, expiry date and security code to be submitted through a site's own form fields. Researchers said it could not see cards typed into hosted payment frames from providers such as Stripe or Adyen. When it swapped an address near payment wording, the script also sent back the page URL, any cookies not marked HttpOnly and a rendered screenshot.
On Apple mobile devices the code fetched a separate script that read the iOS version and loaded either the Coruna or the DarkSword exploit kit in a hidden frame. Hudson Rock, in findings cited by SecurityWeek, said the evidence linked the campaign to exploit delivery infrastructure but did not prove any device was actually compromised, and Cynet described what it captured as conditional delivery rather than a confirmed takeover. Report URI tracked roughly $7,040 in crypto reaching the attacker's wallets on Monday, while StepSecurity put the figure near $6,600 and noted that some of those wallets were active earlier. Nobody has been able to say how many card numbers were taken. The same actor had pushed a related loader through Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media scripts in the days before, according to Report URI. SecurityWeek noted that Optimizely had reported a separate voice phishing intrusion in February.
The incident underscores that a script approved once can change without notice and still arrive from a trusted host. Banks, insurers and other enterprises should keep an inventory of every script running on payment and login pages, with a business justification for each, and should be able to detect unauthorized changes to those scripts and to security headers. PCI DSS 4.0 requirements 6.4.3 and 11.6.1 already expect exactly this for payment pages, and auditors can test whether those controls would have caught a modified vendor file within hours. Subresource Integrity does not fit snippets that update themselves, so a strict Content Security Policy that limits where scripts can send data, hosted payment fields, and keeping marketing and testing tags off checkout pages matter more. Vendor oversight should cover who can edit tag platform accounts, how tokens are rotated, and how quickly a provider will report tampering. Teams that used Optimizely should review project change history for November 16, rotate exposed session cookies and treat cards entered on their own forms that day as possibly compromised.
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